The article addresses the question of how status-quo states can identify revisionist threats. After recasting the question within the collective security and social learning literatures, the article presents and models a new mechanism for the collective identification of threats -screening. It then identifies several conditions for the existence of screening mechanisms, among which states' mutual dependence on one another's support to enforce threats and promises, and restricted opportunities for moral hazard. The model's predictions are then tested on two most similar cases -the two Gulf wars -with collective learning taking place during the former but not the latter. The paired comparison suggests that rather than being misinformed or irrational, Saddam, in 2003, was not offered the kinds of incentives that would have led him to reveal the truth about the state of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
Introduction
Disagreement between the United States and several of its allies with respect to the 2003 Iraq War stands in sharp contrast with the unanimity that presided over the 1991 Gulf War. On both occasions, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council debated on the best way to act toward Saddam Hussein. France, Russia and China promoted caution, whereas Britain and the United States advocated war. The two Anglo-Saxon countries convinced the former three to endorse war in 1990 but not in 2003. What accounts for the difference? Part of the answer has to do with the nature of the military intervention itself, limited to the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 Kuwait in , all-out in 2003 . But part of the answer also has to do with the perception of the threat that motivated the intervention, widely shared by everyone in 1991, disputed in 2003. It is on this second aspect that I wish to concentrate.
The two crises point to the importance of a key factor in the working of collective security -the collective determination of threats. Article 39 of the United Nations Charter states that 'the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression'. This determination is collective in that it must receive the support of a qualified majority in the Council, including unanimous support from the five permanent members (P5). This determination took place with respect to Saddam's Iraq in 1991 but not in 2003.
The collective determination of threat rests on two requisites: the pre-existence of shared values among great powers and a mechanism to detect the existence of an actual threat to these values. Shared values did pre-exist in the two cases chosen for this study, whereas the detection mechanism existed in the first but not the second period. It is on this second requisite that the article focuses.
Students of collective security have addressed the detection problem in several ways. They endorse the classical institutionalist argument that institutions ease transparency and trust among members. They also point to signaling mechanisms.
1 I discuss the inadequacy of these mechanisms in the two cases at hand. I then offer an alternative approach for collective learning which, unlike monitoring and signaling, is proactive. Screening is a label for a situation in which the uninformed party moves first, possibly setting incentives for the informed party to act in a way that reveals its private information. Screening well captures the special reality of UN-Iraq relations in the two periods selected for this study. In both cases, Saddam's Iraq was suspected to be a 'revisionist' state by the P5 and the United States was in the position of confirming or disproving this suspicion by confronting Iraq with a set of options carefully chosen so as to reveal, upon the exercise of one of them, whether Iraq was or not revisionist. Unlike monitoring and signaling, screening is proactive because it forces the state that is suspected of revisionism to reveal its identity in a timely fashion as opposed to just waiting for the latter to make a revealing move -sometimes too late.
As the 2003 experience suggests, however, the conditions for screening are not always met. I use a game-theoretic model to help identify the conditions for a successful screening. Two of them turned out to be of special importance in the two Gulf wars. The first is a desire for the principal country -the United States in these cases -to elicit other countries' support for its intervention. A second condition for screening is the clarity of the threat. There must exist a behavior for the targeted state that can be elicited, is observable, and is subject to minimal moral hazard. Absent these conditions and a few others, screening fails. In the case of the two US-Iraq wars, the model leads me to the conclusion that, rather than being misinformed or irrational, Saddam in 2003 was not offered the kinds of incentives that would have led him to reveal the truth about the state of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. in learning whenever they face an 'ill-structured' problem. 4 These findings dovetail with similar findings in the game-theoretic literature, where the conditions for learning are very well-structured problems, presenting the formal characteristics of separating equilibria in games of incomplete information.
An example of such formalization is signaling -the transmission of private information through the choice of a telling action. The basic logic of signaling games is to sort out in one's head behavior that only a revisionist state would pursue from behavior that only a status-quo lover would pursue and watch which behavior the informed state adopts. 5 In the field of collective security, Kupchan and Kupchan (1995: 126) argue that by encouraging states to maintain low levels of military capability, collective security systems make it 'very difficult for a state to develop robust offensive capability without being detected'. Their views are echoed by so-called 'defensive realists', like Jervis (1978 Jervis ( , 1999 and Glaser (1994-5) , who see in signaling a way of circumventing the security dilemma. They argue that acquiring offensive weapons when the state of technology makes it easy to tell the signature of an offensive from that of a defensive weapon signals revisionism. In contrast, supporting an arms control agreement that would curb the development of offensive weapons in such conditions is evidence of one's benign intentions.
One may think that the Kupchans' and Glaser's ideal world, in which revisionist states would stick out among status-quo neighbors, should have obtained in Iraq. An important question in both 1991 and 2003 was whether or not Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction, a type of weapons easily differentiable from conventional weapons. Iraq was a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and regularly inspected by arms inspectors. Yet, in neither case did signaling work as expected. Neither Saddam's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction until 1991 nor the absence of such pursuit in the years preceding 2003 were detected by the members of the Security Council, except after the fact.
A practical weakness of signaling mechanisms is that they require that the informed player, the one whose behavior is being watched, moves first and does so in a way that is intelligible. Yet, there may not always be the possibility for the status-quo lover to make a move that would enable him to reveal his peaceful type in a timely fashion.
A goal of this article is to point to an alternative detection mechanism, screening. Screening has the advantage of placing the initiative in the hands of those who have a vested interest in ferreting out the truth -the uninformedand who are likely to have the resources it takes to confront the suspected state with the choice set that will force a telling response. 6 One advantage of opting 4. See Stein (2002) .
5. For an example, see Fearon (1997) .
6. For an example of screening in which the principal makes an offer to reveal the resolve for war of the agent, see Powell (1999). for screening instead of signaling may be the greater timeliness of the former over the latter.
Still, like signaling, screening is not always feasible. To explore what the conditions for screening are, I propose to compare and contrast the two Gulf wars between the United States and Iraq, two most similar cases that yielded opposite outcomes. But first, I refine the argument by means of a game that will enable me to draw a richer set of predictions than what can be inferred from a mere narrative on how screening works.
A Screening Model for the Collective Determination of Threat

Generalities
There are three players: sanctioner, target, and third party (sanctioner is a 'she', target a 'he', and third party an 'it'). Sanctioner and third party share a common interest in defending the status quo and, to that effect, agree on a few common principles as to what constitutes revisionist behavior. Sanctioner wishes target to comply with a demand. To that effect sanctioner offers target a reward in exchange for compliance, while threatening military intervention in case of noncompliance. In case of military intervention and holding all else constant, sanctioner would rather enlist the support of third party than go it alone. By working with third party, sanctioner bears a smaller share of the financial burden, deploys fewer troops, and shares in the glow of the legitimacy that pertains to multilateral intervention, reducing the risk of opposition at home (Voeten, 2001; Thompson, 2006) .
The game features adverse selection and a learning option. Target has private information on his type -he can be revisionist or status quo -whereas sanctioner and third party hold identical prior beliefs. Third party's decision to join in the war or stay out, however, is a function of new information that is revealed during the game. This is because third party has a higher cost for war than sanctioner and is de facto biased in favor of target. Sanctioner must reveal that target is revisionist so that third party joins in the military intervention, otherwise third party stays out altogether. Staying out for third party in this game corresponds in practice to the casting of a veto by a P5 country to block the UNSC's endorsement of another member's military intervention.
In addition to adverse selection, the game also features a moral hazard component resulting from the fact that target's behavior may not be directly observable by the other two players. Observability varies according to behavior. For instance, compliance with the obligation not to attack one's neighbor usually is directly observable and limited cause for uncertainty. The act of complying or cheating with the nuclear non-proliferation injunction is not directly observable whether by sanctioner or third party. What is observable is the report drawn by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a report that is not always informative.
Last, I assume that threats and promises are enforceable. This assumption is potentially problematic as one could argue that target may not believe that sanctioner and third party would act upon threats and promises costly to them if they had to. Nevertheless, I assume perfect credibility. Credibility does not result from the way the present game is played, but it does result from the way the larger, unmodeled game would be played. Sanctioner and third party are engaged in subsequent sanction games, involving other targets one at a time. They have an interest in establishing a reputation as credible sanctioners and the only way of doing so is by delivering on the threats and promises that they make to any target. 
Formalism
Define À as the following game between sanctioner Sn, target Tg; and third party 3rd. Sanctioner and target dispute the allocation of a right (the right to own nuclear weapons, the right to support terrorist organizations, etc.) denoted by Z, with Z > 0; Z is not a choice variable, but is set exogenously. An action for sanctioner is a 'carrot-or-stick' message that typically reads like this: 'concede Z in exchange for transfer t or face a military intervention'. Sanctioner chooses the value of t; the set of which is T ¼ t ∈ R þ f g: The payoff for compliance is, for sanctioner, a S Z À t; with positive a S the sanctioner's marginal gain of obtaining Z:
For target, the payoff for compliance is t À Z; with the target's marginal cost of compliance. belongs to the type set Â T ¼ k; K f g with 0 < k < K (k is the marginal cost of the status quo type and K the marginal cost of the revisionist type). Nature tells sanctioner and third party that the type is status quo with probability h; and revisionist with probability 1 À h: Playing first, sanctioner acts on the basis of this prior belief. Playing last, in contrast, third party does not act on the basis of its prior but of its posterior belief q, with q standing for the probability that the type of the target is status quo when third party gets the move.
Target's move is not observable by the other two players. Instead, nature declares target 'in compliance' or 'in breach' with the sanctioner's demand. I assume that nature declares a compliant target in compliance with Probability 1 and that no collective intervention may be taken against a state that has been declared in compliance. The first assumption derives from the very nature of inspections: inspectors cannot physically come up with a positive determination in the absence of nuclear weapons. The second assumption reflects the fact that the UNSC treats states as innocent until found guilty. In the area of nuclear proliferation, a state has to be caught red-handed to be declared in breach by the IAEA. The same goes for the determination of aggression: the UNSC cannot declare a country an aggressor if that country has not militarily invaded one of its neighbors. Therefore, collective intervention requires a positive determination, which, in turn, requires a transgression. Conversely, a transgression does not imply a positive determination, but may go unnoticed. For instance, the inspectors could miss the hot sites. I assume that nature declares a defiant target in compliance with p probability and in breach with 1 À p probability, with 0 < p < 1. If nature declares target in compliance, transfer t is paid, whereas if nature declares target in breach, sanctioner declares war.
8
The payoffs for war are, for sanctioner, 1 À μ ð Þa S Z À c S ; and for target μZ À c T ; c S and c T ; both positive, are the costs of war for sanctioner and target respectively. μ is the probability that target wins the war. μ belongs to the probability set Ç ¼ m; M f g; with m < M; m obtains when third party joins in the war against the target, while M obtains when third party stays out of the war. It is assumed that the winner of the war takes prize Z while the loser gets nothing.
Third party gets the move only after sanctioner declares war against target; it then has to choose between whether to join in or stay out. Payoffs for third party are in part similar, in part dissimilar from sanctioner's. They are similar in that third party values compliance from target as much as sanctioner does. Compliance yields a 3 Z; with a 3 > 0; while defiance yields 0: War yields a 3 Z with 1 À M probability if third party stays out of the war and 1 À m probability if it joins in. Joining in means to spend war cost c 3 :
Third party's payoffs differ from sanctioner's in that third party has a transaction of its own with target. Third party expects Q (think of it as a loan repayment) if target is status quo and nothing if target is revisionist. Moreover, even in the case where target is status quo, it is released from its payment in two cases: if he is defeated in war and if third party joins in, irrespective of the outcome of the war. Joining in the war against status quo yields 1 À m ð Þa 3 Z À c 3 to third party; transfer Q is fully lost. Staying out yields 1 À M ð Þa 3 Z þ MQ; transfer Q is paid with probability M -the probability that target wins the war. Therefore, transfer Q introduces a possible source of disagreement between third party and sanctioner, which may flare up in the case where sanctioner wars against a status quo (or unknown and thus potentially status quo) type. More specifically, I assume that third party's payoffs are such that intervention against 8. The present game is a simplified version of a richer one (with 24 terminal branches) in which nature's negative determination does not preclude intervention, but in which both sanctioner and third party keep the right to intervene or not under any circumstances. In that more general game, compliance by target has the effect of diminishing the probability of a positive finding, not eliminating it as such is the case in the simplified game. Anticipating on results to be presented later, the main difference between the two games lies in the value of the incentive that the sanctioner has to offer to extract compliance from the target irrespective of type: this incentive is higher in the broader game than in the simplified game, because compliance in the broader game carries a risk (the risk of being found guilty), which is not present in the simplified game. a target that is known to be revisionist is preferable to staying out:
I also assume that third party's payoffs are such that non-intervention against an unknown target is preferable to intervention:
These two assumptions together are captured in Condition 1.
As a result of Condition 1, third party's choice is contingent on the information it receives. In the absence of any new information confirming that target is of the revisionist type, third party does not join in a war against target. The game starts when the target observes his own type. Nature communicates the value of h to sanctioner and third party. Then sanctioner chooses transfer t in exchange for compliance. Target responds with compliance or defiance. The other players do not observe target's move. Instead, they observe a declaration from nature. In the case where target complies, nature declares target in compliance with probability 1, thus de facto ending the game; sanctioner pays transfer t while target gives up prize Z: In the case where target defies, nature renders an 'in compliance' finding with probability p inferior to one, ending the game with sanctioner paying t for nothing in exchange. In contrast, an 'in breach' finding, rendered with probability 1 À p; leads to war and the choice by third party whether to join in or stay out. In either case, the game ends and the players' war payoffs are paid.
An abbreviated version of the game tree and payoffs is shown in Figure 1 . Following target's choice of 'comply', the tree shows the payoffs without spelling out two intermediate plays -nature automatically declares target in compliance with probability one and third party stays out.
A strategy for sanctioner specifies transfer t; the set of which is
A strategy for target is the mapping Â T × T → C; D f gspecifying for each type and in response to all possible sanctioner's proposals whether to comply or defy. A strategy for third party is the mapping T → in; out f g; specifying upon getting the move and in response to all possible sanctioner's proposals its decision whether to join in or stay out. I exclusively focus on pure strategy equilibria, a standard practice with a continuous choice set. I denote third party's posterior belief about target type by the conditional probability q jt; breach ð Þ¼Pr ¼ kjt; breach ð Þ ; q is third party's updated belief, after having observed t and an 'in breach' determination, that target is of the status quo type. The equilibrium concept utilized is the perfect Bayesian Nash, which requires posterior beliefs to be calculated using Bayes's rule if possible and each strategy to maximize expected utility given these beliefs and other players' strategies. I use the trembling-hand refinement to pin down beliefs about moves that fall off the equilibrium path. An equilibrium is characterized by a vector t; σ k ; σ K ; σ 3rd ; q ð Þ of strategies and beliefs that satisfy these two conditions, with 318 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 21 (3) σ k , σ K ; and σ 3rd the strategies pursued respectively by status quo target, revisionist target, and third party.
Solution
A simple and intuitive way of solving the game is to remark that sanctioner sets the agenda for everyone. Her choice of transfer is what determines target's response and thus third party's response. This feature of the screening game allows us to partition the universe of possible transfers into three, and only three, sets. First, there are transfers that elicit target's compliance irrespective of type; I refer to this family of sanctioner's strategies as 'pooling on compliance', for securing compliance without revealing target's type. Third party does not learn anything, but this is not relevant because war, the only case in which third party gets the move, is off the equilibrium path. Second, sanctioner may choose a transfer value that leads target to defy irrespective of type; I refer to this family of strategies as 'pooling on defiance' to suggest that the sanctioner is interested neither in compliance nor information revelation. Third party does not learn anything from nature's report and declines to join sanctioner's military expedition. 
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In between these two cases, third, sanctioner may select a transfer such that status quo complies while revisionist defies. The offer is contingent on the target's type and reveals that type; I call this family of separating equilibria 'screening'. If the target is revealed to be revisionist, then third party updates its belief in a direction that is unfavorable to target and finds it in its interest to rally behind sanctioner's military intervention. The three strategy sets form a partition of sanctioner's strategies -they are exhaustive and do not overlap.
From there, solving the game takes two steps. In a first step, I identify the optimal solution for each one of the three equilibrium families. For each family, I define a so-called 'incentive' constraint, which ensures that the target takes the path corresponding to the prescribed equilibrium. For instance, in a pooling on compliance equilibrium, sanctioner should choose transfer t such that target, irrespective of type, weakly prefers Comply to Defy. The reverse should obtain in a pooling on defiance equilibrium, while in the screening case, t should be chosen such that the status quo type complies and the revisionist type defies. In each case, the relevant incentive constraints, one per type, along with a few necessary boundary conditions, define a set of possible solutions among which the sanctioner chooses the one that maximizes her corresponding payoff. From Figure 1 , the payoff that the sanctioner seeks to maximize is a S Z À t in the pooling on compliance equilibrium,
Þ in the pooling on defiance mechanism, and the expected distribution of each,
Þ ; in the screening mechanism, with μ ∈ m; M f g. The value of μ -the probability that target wins the war -reflects the existence or not of learning by third party. In the screening equilibrium, the one in which the target reveals his private information, if the information thus revealed is 'revisionist', then third party gets a chance to fight on sanctioner's side; μ is equal to m. In both pooling equilibria, in contrast, no information is revealed and third party stays out of the war; μ is equal to M. These partial results are presented and proven in the form of lemmas in the Appendix.
Once a unique optimal equilibrium has been identified for each equilibrium family, the sanctioner is left, in a second step, with the residual task of determining which, of the three, she prefers. This preference varies according to parametric circumstances.
I solve the problem only for low values of transfer Q (see Condition 2 in the Appendix). Large values of Q distort the screening problem in the sense that the status quo type prefers to fight war with third party rather than pay Q: Large values of Q also make compliance by the status quo type impossible.
The result is stated in Proposition 1 (spelled out and proven in the Appendix). blind compliance CC ð Þ at no cost (t Ã ¼ 0Þ; a high cost of war for sanctioner also yields blind compliance, but at some cost t Ã > 0 ð Þ; a low cost of war for both sides yields blind defiance DD ð Þ: Screening equilibria CD ð Þ exist for intermediate cost values; they are more or less costly to sanctioner depending on target's cost of war. These partial results are reprised in the following comparative statics below, along with all the other ones.
Comparative Statics
There are two dependent variables: the compliance structure (whether sanctioner pursues pooling on compliance, pooling on defiance, or screening), and the value of the transfer (how costly it is for the sanctioner to extract compliance). Comparative statics yields eight predictions that are empirically relevant to one or both outcomes (see Appendix). The only parameter that I exclude from the comparative statics is the 'objective' value of compliance, Z: This parameter does not refer to anything observable -only the subjective values a S Z, a 3 Z, kZ; or KZ; that is, constant Z modified by the marginals specific to sanctioner, third party, status quo, and revisionist respectively, are potentially observable. 
Observability of Target's Behavior (Moral Hazard)
The more difficult it is for other players to spot defiance on target's part, the harder it is for sanctioner to find a strategy that would deliver compliance from either type. As the probability p that defiance is mistaken for compliance increases, pooling on compliance becomes less attractive than screening, and the latter less so than pooling on defiance. Moreover, in the two equilibria involving compliance, a rise in p makes compliance costlier to extract. In sum, a larger moral hazard component makes it more expensive or merely impossible to extract compliance from any type.
Sanctioner's Cost of Fighting
As shown in Figure 2 , a sanctioner who is worried about her cost of fighting, c S ; is more likely to avoid the war path, preferring pooling on compliance to screening and screening to pooling on defiance. A rise in c S leaves the transfer value unchanged.
Target's Cost of Fighting
As shown in Figure 2 , a change in the cost of fighting for target, c T ; leads to very similar predictions. An increase makes it easier to extract pooling on compliance from the target, whereas decreasing it makes screening or even pooling on defiance preferable. Moreover, a rise in c T makes compliance less costly to extract.
Decisiveness of Third Party's Support
If the intervention by third party on the side of the sanctioner is decisive -the value M À m is large -then the sanctioner is more likely to prefer screening to any form of pooling. The reason is that sanctioner cannot take advantage of outside help unless she motivates third party to join in the war against an eventual revisionist type; she can only do so by revealing target's type. Moreover, a rise in M increases the range of pooling on compliance equilibria with a positive transfer and the value thereof, while a drop in m reduces the range of screening equilibria with a positive transfer and the value thereof.
Sanctioner's Prior Belief
A very strong belief that target is revisionist (a low hÞ makes screening less attractive than either pooling strategies. It makes screening less attractive than pooling on compliance because it raises the anticipated probability of defiance. It also makes screening less attractive than pooling on defiance in some cases,
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characterized by low values in some other parameters (c T ; M À m; and K À kÞ:
A change in h does not affect transfer values.
Type Differential
The intensity of the adverse selection problem reflects more than the uncertainty of the target type -whether target is status quo or revisionist; it also reflects how revisionist can revisionist be. The adverse selection problem is severe if the type differential, K À k; is large. The type differential measures with certainty the potentially negative impact of uncertainty about types. Since the aim of screening is to eliminate the negative impact that uncertainty has on the sanctioner's payoff, it is logical that screening becomes more desirable as the type differential increases. A rise in the type differential also increases the price of compliance in general.
Sanctioner's Marginal Gain for Compliance
A rise in the sanctioner's marginal gain of compliance, a S ; makes any form of compliance better than defiance. A change in a S does not affect the price of compliance, t, however, because the entire bargaining power is vested in the sanctioner on the grounds that sanctioner plays first.
Third Party's Marginal Gain for Compliance
Variations in third party's valuation of compliance, a 3 ; has no impact on the results.
Target's Transfer to Third Party
We already saw that if transfer Q from status quo target to third party is too high, any form compliance by a status quo target is inefficient -defiance and war are more efficient. For low values of Q, however, a rise in Q also has the effect of pricing out compliance within separating equilibria. The reason is that the sanctioner must offer a transfer t that includes transfer Q: Indeed, think of Q as a loan repayment to third party, which intervenes fully as long as status quo target remains at peace. To deter status quo target from fighting, sanctioner has to pay for the loan herself. Instead, sanctioner may prefer to pursue a pooling strategy on defiance.
The Case Studies
The two American military interventions in Iraq provide us with two cases of collective determination of threat. In both cases, Washington argued before the UNSC that Iraq was governed by a revisionist leader who violated principles shared by all status-quo nations -territorial integrity in 1990, nuclear non-proliferation in 2003 -and presented a threat to collective security in the Middle East that justified a collective military intervention. Moreover, the two cases are comparable in that they are similar in a large number of characteristics which are external to the model and which one would want to treat as constants -the target-sanctioner couple was identical in relative size, location, institutions, culture, and political leadership across periods because they were the same countries, led by the same leader in Iraq and members of the same family in the United States. It remains to show that the two cases are dissimilar in all or some of the variables included in the model and that these variables are related to each other according to the predictions that were formulated in the prior section.
Since there are only two cases, the values taken by each variable cannot be assessed against an absolute benchmark but make sense only within the paired comparison. To proceed with the comparison, therefore, I select 1989-91 as the benchmark case, against which I compare 2003. The presentation of the evidence takes three steps: I present each case sequentially and survey the fit with the comparative statics.
Bush Senior against a Younger Saddam (1989-91)
I show in this section that in October 1989, at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the George H. W. Bush administration endeavored to find out whether or not they could normalize their relations with Iraq. Washington decided to engage Saddam, dangling before his eyes the promise to eliminate extant sanctions in exchange for cooperation on a broad array of issues of concern to the US. Following a period of hesitation, Saddam turned the policy down when he invaded Kuwait in 1990, bringing Washington and the rest of the world to see him as a revisionist.
After the end of the Iran-Iraq War and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United States reviewed its policy in the Persian Gulf Region. In light of an ongoing aggiornamento taking place in Iraq (weakened relations with Moscow, endorsement of a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, non-aggression pact with Saudi Arabia) the Bush administration in its National Security Directive 26 (NSD 26), released on 2 October 1989, recognized the need to stabilize relations with Iraq. Yet, as Kenneth Juster (2000: 56) , then a senior official at the State Department, recalls, recognition was explicitly made contingent on 'the desired behavior':
The directive recognized the need to probe and test the Iraqis as part of the effort to moderate their behavior. On the one hand, NSD 26 proposed expanded 'economic and political incentives for Iraq' and directed the facilitation of 'opportunities for In a nutshell, Saddam was offered the two options that are typical of a screening mechanism: behave and be rewarded with trade and aid, or else keep facing extant or worsening economic and diplomatic sanctions. According to the directive, behaving meant giving up any 'illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons' and respecting 'international safeguards in its nuclear program'. The directive also included 'human rights considerations', 'negotiating a settlement with Iran', and 'cooperating in the Middle East peace process'. 9 Brent Scowcroft, who occupied the position of national security adviser at the time, summarized the policy as a 'mix of limited incentives and strong disincentives' (Washington Post, 10 October, 1992). The administration did not know whether Saddam's apparent change of course was real or duplicitous and what his response to US advances would be. But they knew the type of Saddam they were willing to work with and accordingly provided enough incentives so that, were Saddam to be that type, he would accept. Otherwise, sanctions were deemed preferable.
According to its authors, the policy met broad support. Speaking directly of NSD 26, Scowcroft said, 'our policy had universal support within the Arab world. Kuwait strongly supported it. So did moderate states like Egypt. So did every European power. So did virtually every American expert on the Middle East. So did most members of Congress' (Washington Post, 10 October 1992).
Saddam's initial response was mixed. Publicly, he was critical of US naval presence, made a concerted effort to develop chemical and biological weapons plus a missile launcher, and threatened to bomb Israel with chemical weapons. Privately, he was conciliatory (Baker, 1995) . As a result, the State Department did not reassess its policy. This seeming case of blindness was even more pronounced outside Washington. Kuwaitis and Saudis, according to Baker, thought that Saddam was 'only posturing'. So did the French who, for nearly two decades, served as Iraq's principal patron and apologist in the western world. In exchange for selling Iraq the advanced weaponry it could not get from Moscow, Baghdad lavished big infrastructure contracts on French companies.
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Such blindness did reflect the existence of vested business and strategic interests but also, and this is the point I wish to stress, the absence of hard 
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evidence that Saddam had opted for defiance. None of the constructive policies listed in NSD 26 -relative to chemical and biological weapons, nuclear safeguards, human rights, Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian peace processwere directly observable. Saddam's most egregious violation, the 1988 gassing campaign of the Kurds, which claimed the lives of more than 100,000 individuals, elicited no more than registrations of 'concern' by western chancelleries. The reason, according to a State Department official, was the evidence: 'Everybody thinks they used chemical weapons, but we haven't seen positive proof. . . Given the sensitivity of the issue, we want to make absolutely sure before we pass judgment' (The New York Times, 8 September 1988). Allegations that Iraq was trying to acquire nuclear weapons offered no stronger base for consensus. None of the safeguards and inspections imposed under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty to which Baghdad was a party had led to any findings. Neither human rights violations nor proliferation could reveal Saddam's true ambitions because they were not directly observable.
In contrast, the cold invasion of a defenceless neighbor provided observable and irrefutable evidence of Saddam's revisionism. Learning for the Bush administration was immediate: 'practically overnight, we went from trying to work with Saddam to likening him to Hitler', Baker (1995: 31) wrote. Upon learning that Iraqi troops were crossing the border of Kuwait, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told his American counterpart that Saddam's move was 'irrational' and 'inconsistent with the principles of new political thinking and, in fact, with the civilized relations between nations' (Baker, 1995: 2, 6 ). Absent the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Baker (1995) remarked, it would have been impossible for the United States to move armed forces to the region: 'neither the Kuwaitis, the Saudis, the Soviets, nor the Congress would have supported that course before August 2'.
Although NSD 26 did not specifically include the obligation to respect Kuwaiti territorial sovereignty, this obligation was subsumed under the main goal of maintaining peace in the region. If Saddam was expected not to be a cause of instability in the region, a fortiori he was expected not to invade any of his wealthy neighbors. The principle at stake was the norm of territorial integrity enshrined in the United Nations and OAU charters as well as in the CSCE's Helsinki Final Act.
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Many have claimed that the United States did not try to deter the invasion of Kuwait, because Saddam was never explicitly threatened with military retaliation if he invaded Kuwait.
12 Although literally correct, the claim is substantially weak. The deterrence failure was caused by a failure to recognize that an Iraqi invasion was possible and imminent, not by an hesitation to condemn the use of force. As Baker (1995: 274) wrote, 'the reason why nobody believed Saddam 11. On the norm of territorial integrity, see Zacher (2001) .
12. See Mearsheimer and Walt (2003) , Jervis (2003) and Kaufmann (2004) .
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would attack is because no realistic calculation of his interests could have foreseen a full-scale invasion of Kuwait'. Even if Saddam did not grasp all the implications of NSD 26, the American ambassador in Baghdad told Saddam himself that Washington expected that disputes such as the one he was having with Kuwait 'should be settled by peaceful means, not intimidation and threats of use of force' (Baker, 1995: 271-74) . Still others have argued that Iraq did not behave any differently on 2 August than it had until then, but that it was the United States that changed its definition of threat in a presidential address given on that very same day.
13 As a result, there could not have been any common knowledge between the US, Iraq, and the rest of the world on what constituted a threat. The problem with this interpretation, however, is that it cannot account for the concurring position of foreign leaders, notably Gorbachev and Mitterrand, who did not share the new American military doctrine. This consensus demonstrated the prior existence of a shared understanding of the meaning of revisionism, which Saddam could have spurned but not be ignorant of.
The US engagement policy toward Iraq helped frame the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in a light that was favorable to the US administration and helped other countries see eye to eye with Washington. The point is echoed by Juster (2000: 62) , who writes in defence of the administration's engagement policy in the following terms: a policy of unilateral sanctions probably would not have had a positive influence on Saddam nor would it have provided the basis to organize later international action against him. Therefore, the engagement policy eventually succeeded in revealing Saddam's type. The Bush administration had offered Saddam a deal that was considered as acceptable by most other interested parties. By turning it down, Saddam revealed revisionist ambitions to the international community and made it impossible for Iraq's traditional allies to come to his support. The Bush administration had no difficulty after 2 August convincing the French, Russians, Saudis, and Congress to take sides against Saddam. UN Security Council Resolution 678, authorizing the use of force against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait in 45 days, was passed by a vote of 12-2, with the USSR and France voting in favor, China abstaining, and Cuba and Yemen voting against. Thirty-one nations joined in the US-led military coalition to defend Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait.
13. In the address, Bush shifted the focus away from Europe to regional conflicts and saw a need for the United States military to be able to project force abroad. See Klare (1995), and Mutimer (2000) .
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Bush Junior against an Older Saddam (2002-3)
Following the Gulf War, the UN Security Council inflicted an intrusive armsinspection regime on Iraq. Within a few years, however, the sanction regime lost its initial focus, dividing the Gulf War coalition along traditional lines: the French and the Russians were willing to see the sanctions lifted, whereas the British and the Clinton administration wanted to use the sanctions to oust Saddam. In 1998 Saddam tried to regain leverage by evicting the last arms inspector and making further inspection conditional on a lifting of the oil embargo.
14 From then on, the Council was deadlocked. The United States regained control of the agenda after 9/11, when the newly elected Bush administration pressed new charges against Saddam -they accused him of supporting al-Qaeda and secretly pursuing new weapons-of-mass-destruction programs.
The charge was that Saddam was a 'rogue state', a third-world state possessing weapons of mass destruction and sponsoring terrorism. Although very few countries outside the US and the UK used the word officially -France, Russia, and China even criticized its use by American officials -there was a common understanding among the P5 that if the United States could prove Saddam guilty on at least one of two counts -nuclear proliferation or terrorism -while Saddam refused to admit to it, a military intervention would be justified. The P5 debated the best way to deal with Saddam. Convinced that Saddam was guilty, Bush and Blair advocated war; skeptical, yet confident that sanctions would suffice to extract compliance, Chirac and Putin preferred to send back the arms inspectors.
The P5 agreed to resolution 1441 in November 2002, in which, the UN Security Council first laid out the action that was expected from Saddam: Iraq shall first provide a full and accurate declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems and then accept the return of a UN team of inspectors to assess the veracity of the report. The resolution further laid out the threat: false statements or omissions in the declaration and failure at any time to cooperate fully with the inspectors 'shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations' for which 'it will face serious consequences' -code words for a potential military invasion. The resolution offered no explicit reward for compliance.
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Although the incentive structure offered by the resolution read like a classic screening strategy, it did not function as such, but masked a logic of war. Several aspects pointed to pooling on defiance. First, the resolution was ambiguous as to what would constitute defiance. For some, the so-called 'hawks' in the Bush administration, inaccuracies in the declaration, which, they thought, could be easily proved by US intelligence, would be sufficient ground for invading 14 . For a history of the 1990s, see Kibbe (2001) .
References are to Resolution 1441 adopted at Security Council meeting 4644 (8 November 2002).
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Iraq. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld dismissed inspections as inherently ineffective when the host country is uncooperative (New York Times, 16 January 2003). For others, the French in particular, the only acceptable casus belli would be a declaration by the UN chief weapons inspector that they could no longer do their work because of Iraqi refusal to cooperate. Second, the timetable did not leave enough time for the inspectors to reach a meaningful conclusion. Inspection is a time-dependent stochastic process, which can at best produce a sequence of dated estimates of the degree of compliance with an error term which, very large at first, narrows down as more inspections are performed. This means that the Bush administration, which was persuaded that Saddam was hiding weapons, could not be convinced of the contrary until all possible sites were hit. The figure that was regularly advanced in Washington for completing the inspections was two years 16 -an unacceptably long process for an administration intent on solving the Iraqi problem in six months or less. France in vain offered a plan to increase aerial surveillance flights, triple the number of inspectors and give them enough time to complete their job.
Third, the drawbacks of the inspection process opened the possibility that a status-quo Saddam, whatever he did, could not persuade the US of his innocence. The process that the UN put in place, because it was not given enough time to work, was a one-sided screening mechanism, only able to spot a revisionist Saddam with some probability. It offered no possibility for a statusquo Saddam to prove his willingness to cooperate, giving ground to the rumor that, no matter what Saddam did or said, the US and its allies were out to 'get' him.
Successive events matched the path of play that is characteristic of the pooling on defiance equilibrium. Iraq delivered a 12,000-page declaration on the country's weapons program which was derided in Washington as bogus. The inspectors went to work and were able to deliver three inconclusive progress reports. Cooperation with the inspectors 'fell short', in Hans Blix's own terms, of the 'immediate, active and unconditional cooperation' that was specified in Resolution 1441. Saddam behaved in a way that was unintelligible. Washington completed the deployment of US troops in the Gulf and, on 19 March, launched the attack with the help of Britain, but against the opposition of France, Germany, Russia, and China. The war had the support of Japan, Australia, South Korea, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania and was opposed by most of the rest of the world, including Canada.
An often-raised question in the six to twelve months that followed the war was, 'If Hussein did not have chemical or biological weapons, why did . . . he allow UN inspectors to conclude that he was being deceptive?' (Washington Post, 2 November 2003). Many observers have been tempted to argue that 16. According to Rolf Ekeus, former chief arms inspector (New Republic, 2 December 2002).
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Saddam was poorly informed or irrational. 17 There is no evidence, I contend, that Saddam was misinformed or irrational, any more than there is any evidence that he was well informed or rational. His behavior is consistent with assumptions of complete information (on his side) and rationality. The deal he was offered could not separate status quo from revisionist, leading both types to pool on defiance.
The inspection regime could not lift the uncertainty. The monitoring process spelled out in Resolution 1441 did not generate the type of information that would help narrow down the boundaries of the debate on how to best deal with Iraq and bring the US and the UK position closer to the French and the Russian. US former president Jimmy Carter condemned the war on Iraq for not being 'just', on the grounds that it was not 'waged only as a last resort, with all nonviolent options exhausted' (New York Times, 9 March, 2003).
Variations between the Two Cases
We are now ready to answer the question raised by the paired comparison: why did the Bush-junior administration decide for pooling on defiance and unilateralism where the Bush-senior administration had preferred type revelation and multilateralism? I review each comparative statics, assessing the value taken in 2003 in relation to that taken in 1989. I conclude with a short remark on the comparative statics with respect to the value of the transfer.
Moral hazard. Moral hazard was higher in 2003 than in 1990 because
Iraq's defiance in the prior period took the form of a military aggression, an observable behavior, whereas in 2003 it was expected to take the form of nuclear dissemination or support for terrorists, two forms of action that could not be verified from the outside. Since compliance was not readily verifiable, there was the possibility that a revisionist Saddam would try to pass as status quo. For instance, if Iraq were to actually possess banned weapons, Saddam could deny it and hope that the inspectors would miss them. Expecting this, the Bush administration in 2003 was justified in believing that the inspection regime would fail to deliver results on short notice. 5.3.3 Target's cost of fighting. We have no direct evidence as to the way the Iraqi regime perceived the cost of war in the two periods. Still, there are reasons to believe that it was higher in 1990, when Iraqis were fighting for Kuwait, than in 2003, when they were fighting to defend Iraq itself. A key finding of prospect theory is that individuals are more eager to take chances to defend what they already own than to acquire what they do not own (Levy, 1997) . Kuwait was not part of the Iraqi homeland and was thus unlikely to command a like resolve. Baker (1995) argued in his book that international support for the war played a decisive role in convincing Congress to support the war in 1991. In 2002, in contrast, the administration won domestic support without having to garner international support; Congress did not wait for a UN Security Council endorsement to authorize the president to use force against Iraq as they had in 1991.
Prior beliefs.
The US administration's prior belief on how likely it was that Saddam valued the status quo, though never very high, was nevertheless higher prior to the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 than a decade later, when the official goal in Washington had become regime change. Those in Washington who were behind NSD 26 believed that Iraq was ready to change course. Saddam could be made to work with the United States. A decade later, however, the administration held a strong belief that Saddam was a rogue.
5.3.6 Type differential. Given the opacity of his rule, both dictatorial and secretive, Saddam was still considered in 1990 as an unknown quantity. The range of possibility of Iraq's type was very wide -it might be very status quo, whereas it might also be very revisionist. There was a good chance that his fiery 18. One might object that Saddam did not expect in 1990 the massive deployment of troops that followed the invasion of Kuwait, whereas he had the benefit of hindsight in 2003. Relative troop size, however, does not measure the cost of war but the power ratio (captured by the probability of winning and losing).
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rhetoric was not reducible to mere posturing for advantage, but also that he could be a very dangerous type. There was no obvious limited territorial goal that an Iraqi leader feeling chronically insecure could strive to meet and that would satisfy him. Thirteen years later, more data points allowed the world to narrow down the uncertainty to a smaller range of options. No one in 2003 expected Saddam to invade his Arab neighbors. The man was the same, but ten years of sanctions had clipped his territorial ambitions.
5.3.7 Sanctioner's marginal gain for compliance. For the same reasons that the US cost of fighting declined after 9/11, it seems fair to assume that the United States valued Iraqi compliance more in 2003 than in 1989.
5.3.8 Target's transfer to third party. In both episodes, French and Russian banks were owed billions of dollars by Iraq. An important difference, at least in the case of France, was the partisan orientation of the government, more probusiness under Chirac than under Mitterrand.
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These predictions are summarized in Table 1 , featuring the name of the parameter, its value in 2003 relative to that in 1989-90, and the derived likelihood of pooling on defiance in 2003 relative to 1989. The model clearly suggests that the shift from screening in 1989 to pooling on defiance in 2003 was, though not totally overdetermined, sufficiently so to lend credibility to the present explanation. Despite holding higher stakes in Iraqi compliance in the second period, a factor militating for collective learning and multilateral intervention, factors such as higher moral hazard, lower costs of fighting on both sides, lower 19. For a day-by-day account of Mitterrand's unofficial statements on the 1990 crisis, see Attali (1995) .
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decisiveness of UN endorsement, weaker beliefs that Saddam valued the status quo, and reduced type differential, all militated in favor of unilateral intervention. The discussion has so far been exclusively concerned with the comparative statics pertaining to the compliance structure (screening v. pooling on defiance v. pooling on compliance); I have said nothing about the value of the transfer. The comparative statics with respect to the latter, however, are trivial in the present case. The model predicts that a shift from a screening offer to a pooling on defiance strategy implies a shift from a positive transfer to a transfer that is equal to zero irrespective of values taken by any parameter. As seen earlier, positive incentives were offered to Saddam in 1989 in the form of economic cooperation with the United States, whereas none were in 2003.
Conclusion
The article argues that status-quo states can collectively learn to identify peripheral threats if they share a set of core values and agree to a proactive policy of conditional engagement equivalent to a screening mechanism. The article identifies several conditions for the functioning of a screening mechanism, including restricted opportunities for moral hazard and dependence among sanctioners on one another's support to enforce threats and promises. The screening mechanism should be of special interest to policymakers. In a world where effective action is collective action, acquiring intelligence is necessary but insufficient; mechanism design is a possible way of eliciting information.
The article offers an original explanation for why the P5 agreed to war against Iraq in 1990 but were divided on this issue in 2003. In both cases, the United States confronted Saddam with a choice between complying with rules of international conduct or risk war, but only in the first episode were the options constructed so as to make Saddam's choice of behavior a true reflection of his attitude, capable of eliciting learning among the members of the UN Security Council. In 2003 the United States had no similar interest in revealing Saddam's true aims to the world. Willing to go it alone if necessary, Washington forced Saddam into a behavior of non-compliance that failed to reveal his type and rally the support from other UNSC members. Thanks to the model, it was possible to attribute this change to a wide variety of parametric shifts: the inefficiency of the inspection regime, a higher tolerance for projecting US force abroad, even absent UN endorsement, a firmer conviction that Saddam was a rogue, yet a more predictable one after ten years of sanctions, and the fact that the stakes were higher for Iraqis. The fact that 9/11 also made compliance with nuclear disarming more important to the United States in 2003 than in 1989, however, was insufficient to prevent the slide to war. (Jervis, 2003: 323) . In my view, the fact that Saddam was not deterred in 1990 is no evidence that he could not be deterred in 2003. The events of 9/11 and the presence in Washington of an administration intent on going to war were the determinant factors. Furthermore, the fact that he failed to 'cry uncle' in the face of US preparation for a full-scale invasion of Iraq the second time around but concealed his innocence at the cost of seemingly inviting the war and the end to his rule does not testify to his undeterrability but to his unintelligibility. Saddam was not offered the proper incentives because resolution 1441 created a sanction regime that could not separate a status quo from a revisionist type. ' ' : I first & solve for t ∈ T CC ; then for t ∈ T DD ; then for t ∈ T CD ; and last for t ∈ T :
The complexity of the target's payoffs -the combination of transfers t and Q -taxes the solution with a large number of cases, some of which with limited interest to us. Hence, a high value of Q has the effect of making any form of compliance by status quo target impossible. I rule out these uninteresting cases by limiting the analysis to low values of Q; more specifically
20. The fullest exposition is Pollack (2002) .
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The intuition behind the first term (condition 2a) is that, in its absence, a high Q prices out compliance by status quo target, thereby eliminating the possibility for a separating equilibrium in which the status quo type complies and the revisionist type does not. 21 The intuition behind the second term (condition 2b) is that, in its absence, a high Q makes the status quo target prefer to fight a war against third party rather than have to repay Q.
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LEMMA 1: The pooling on compliance menu that maximizes the sanctioner's utility
Proof. I first determine the target's probability of winning an eventual war, μ.
The value of μ depends on third party's choice to join in or stay out, in turn a function of her belief, q: I determine q using the trembling-hand refinement according to which target complies with probability 1 À ε θ ; defies with probability ε θ ; with θ ∈ 0; 1 f g; ε 0 ¼ ε 1 ¼ ε; and ε positive and very small. The substantive reason for equating ε 0 and ε 1 reflects the screening nature of the game. Third party observes transfer t offered by sanctioner and from this value infers that the equilibrium is pooling on compliance. Upon observing defiance, however, third party concludes to a sheer mistake on target's part, a mistake that is uncorrelated with target's type. By Bayes' rule, q ¼ hε hεþ 1Àh ð Þε ¼ h: As a result, third party stays out and μ ¼ M.
The sanctioner who would want to maximize her objective function U · ð Þ by means of a pooling on compliance mechanism would face the following problem: max t U CC ð Þ ¼ a S Z À t subject to several constraints. A first constraint ensures that the revisionist type complies rather than defies. Formally
The same must be true of the status quo type:
A third constraint is t ≥ 0 to ensure that transfer t does not turn into a sanction. The objective function is semi-concave and the problem solvable by means of the Kuhn-Tucker algorithm (Kreps, 1990) . I use λ; φ and γ; with λ; φ; γ ≥ 0; as multipliers for the three constraints in the order listed. The maximization yields the following first-order condition λ þ φ ð Þ 1 À p ð Þþγ ¼ 1; which yields seven cases, only three of them meet condition 2a:
21. The expression is derived from the proofs of lemmas 3 and 4.
22. Condition 2b results from assuming that for the status-quo type, the utility for war excluding third party is higher than the utility of war including third party:
The pooling on defiance menu that maximizes the sanctioner's utility is the menu t
Proof. By Bayes's rule, q ¼ h. In light of condition 1, third party stays out and Target's probability of winning the war, μ; is equal to M.
The sanctioner who would want to maximize her objective function by means of a pooling on defiance mechanism would want to solve the following problem: max
for status quo and revisionist respectively, and the boundary constraint t ≥ 0: Rearranging the first two constraints as a function of t yields inequalities of the form t ≤ . . . ; suggesting that neither constraint can ever bind the sanctioner, who seeks to reduce t as much as possible. The last constraint alone puts a floor under the value of t and is thus binding, yielding
The screening menu that maximizes the sanctioner's utility is t
Proof. The revelation of private information that characterizes the screening mechanism implies that if third party ever gets the play it is because target is revisionist (Condition 2a), leading third party to join in the war against target. Therefore, q ¼ 0 and μ ¼ m: The sanctioner thus solves problem: ; negative otherwise; the former is always true
In sum, a rise in p decreases the range of values for which pooling on compliance obtains, while it increases that for which pooling on defiance obtains provided that k > a S . Also, because a rise in p raises the two cutpoints
increases the range of equilibria, screening and pooling on compliance respectively, in which the sanctioner must offer a transfer that is greater than zero. It also raises the equilibrium value of t in the t > 0 equilibria. 
<0:
A rise in the sanctioner's cost of fighting disqualifies strategies that involve fighting -pooling on defiance and, to a lesser extent, screening -to the benefit of strategies that exclude fighting -pooling on compliance. Respective ranges between t > 0 and t ¼ 0 equilibria are not affected. 
In sum, a rise in the belief that the target is status quo makes screening more attractive than pooling on compliance; it also makes screening more attractive than pooling on defiance for low values of c T . There is no impact on the price of compliance.
K Àk : Type differential 
Recall that Q is already constrained to be small by condition 2 on the grounds that a high Q would price out any form of compliance. Yet, a rise of Q within the authorized range laid out by condition 2 negatively impacts separating equilibria only, and this, within the range
; the range for which revelation equilibria require a non-zero transfer t: A rise in %Q makes this transfer more expensive for sanctioner, therefore reducing the range of this type of equilibria.
